Golden Gate University School of Law

GGU Law Digital Commons
GGU Law Review Blog

Student Scholarship

3-16-2015

Yates v. United States: The Supreme Court Lets
Florida Fisherman Off the Hook for SarbanesOxley Charge
Collin McCarthy
Golden Gate University School of Law, lawreview@ggu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggu_law_review_blog
Part of the Commercial Law Commons
Recommended Citation
McCarthy, Collin, "Yates v. United States: The Supreme Court Lets Florida Fisherman Off the Hook for Sarbanes-Oxley Charge"
(2015). GGU Law Review Blog. Paper 33.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggu_law_review_blog/33

This Blog Post is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Scholarship at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in GGU Law Review Blog by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact jfischer@ggu.edu.

3/18/2015

Yates v. United States: The Supreme Court Lets Florida Fisherman Off the Hook for SarbanesOxley Charge | Golden Gate University Law Review Online

Golden Gate University Law Review Online
Accessible Legal Scholarship.

Yates v. United States: The Supreme Court
Lets Florida Fisherman Off the Hook for
SarbanesOxley Charge
March 16, 2015 ∙ by Collin McCarthy ∙ in GGU Law Review. ∙

(https://ggulawreview.files.wordpress.com/2015/03/fishing.jpg)
Last month, the Supreme Court delivered its opinion in Yates v. United States
(http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/13‑7451_m64o.pdf), overturning the Eleventh
Circuit and holding that a provision of Sarbanes Oxley – the law enacted in response to the sort
of corporate and accounting fraud seen in the Enron scandal – does not apply to the destruction
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of fish. That’s right, fish – Red Grouper to be specific. While this may seem like the obvious
result, considering the activities of South Florida fisherman share little in common with the sort
of white collar crimes we associate with Sarbanes‑Oxley, the two lower courts hearing the issue
reached a different conclusion, and even the Supreme Court was divided 4‑1‑4. Ultimately
concluding Congress had specific intentions when drafting the poorly worded statute at issue,
the plurality dug deep into its tackle box of statutory interpretation tools to limit the scope of
the broad phrase “tangible object.” As a plain meaning interpretation would render the statute
applicable in virtually every instance of evidence tampering, the Court expressed concern over
the leverage the threat of twenty years behind bars would provide prosecutors, especially in
instances such as this, where the defendant’s conduct amounts to a mere civil infraction.
In August 2007, John Yates, captain of the Miss Katie, a commercial fishing boat based out of
South Florida, was six days into an expedition in the Gulf of Mexico when Officer John Jones of
the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission boarded his vessel to perform a routine
inspection. While on board, Officer Jones noticed several fish hanging on the deck that
appeared under the legal limit of 20 inches, a violation punishable by fine or fishing license
suspension. Suspecting there may be more, Officer Jones proceeded to inspect the remainder of
the Miss Katie’s catch, ultimately discovering 72 undersized fish. After separating the
undersized fish from the others, Officer Jones issued Yates a citation and instructed him to leave
the fish separated until his vessel returned to port, where they could be properly documented
and disposed of.
Four days after the initial interaction, Officer Jones again met up with the Miss Katie upon the
vessel’s return to port. Jones reinspected the catch, measuring the fish that had been previously
separated as under the legal limit. However, after measuring the fish a second time, Officer
Jones noticed the sizes did not match up with his records; although the fish were still
undersized, most were just barely under 20 inches. Suspecting the fish were not the same fish
he measured before, Officer Jones began an investigation in which he discovered Yates had
instructed his crewmembers to throw the smaller fish overboard, and to replace them with
other fish in the catch. Based on his orders, Yates was indicted for destroying, concealing, and
covering up undersized fish to impede a federal investigation, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1519
(https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1519).
As noted above, Section 1519 was enacted as part of the Sarbanes‑Oxley Act of 2002 – legislation
intended to protect investors by targeting acts of corporate fraud. Section 1519, titled
“Destruction, alteration, or falsification of records in Federal investigations and bankruptcy,”
provides:
“Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false
entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or
influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any
department or agency of the United States…shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more
than 20 years, or both.”

The issue the court had to decide in the case was whether the fish Yates tossed overboard fall
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The issue the court had to decide in the case was whether the fish Yates tossed overboard fall
within the scope of a “tangible object” as that term is used in the statute. The Department of
Justice urged to the Court to apply a plain meaning interpretation of the phrase, a formulation
with which the Federal District Court and Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals agreed. Yates, on
the other hand, pointed to Section 1519’s title and origin as a provision of Sarbanes‑Oxley,
arguing the statute “only applies to records, documents, or tangible items that relate to
recordkeeping.”
In a four‑one‑four decision, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for the plurality, reversed the
lower court and agreed with Yates’ interpretation. Focusing on the context in which the phrase
“tangible object” appears, the section’s title and location amongst other specialized provisions
in the code, and the list of words preceding the phrase, the main opinion concluded “tangible
object” within Section 1519 is limited to those objects used to record or preserve information.
Relying in part of the principle of noscitur a sociis – “a word is known by the company it keeps”
– the court stated, “‘[t]angible object’ is the last in a list of terms that begins ‘any record or
document.’ The term is therefore appropriately read to refer, not to any tangible object, but
specifically to the subset of tangible objects involving records and documents, i.e. objects used
to record or preserve information.” Justice Alito, in his concurring opinion, similarly relied on
the statute’s list of nouns and verbs preceding the phrase “tangible object,” as well as the
section’s title. In his view, “[a]lthough perhaps none of these features by itself would tip the
case in favor of Yates, the three combined do so.”
According to the dissent, authored by Justice Kagan and joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy and
Thomas, the issue was much simpler than the plurality’s “fishing expedition” to come up with
an interpretation made it out to be. In their view, the plain meaning of “tangible object”
includes fish, and the long list of words surrounding the phrase expressed Congress’ intent that
the statute has a wide range of application. Despite agreeing with the plurality that Section 1519
is a “bad law – too broad and undifferentiated, with too‑high maximum penalties, which gives
prosecutors too much leverage and sentencers too much discretion[,]” the dissent saw the
plurality as replacing a statute enacted by Congress with an alternative of its own design.
Although the plurality’s opinion in Yates reads like a lesson in obscure principles of statutory
interpretation, the oral argument (http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010‑2019/2014_13_7451) in this
case provides the greatest insight to the justifications for the holding. After asking the
Department of Justice attorney about several hypothetical scenarios such as an individual
throwing back a single undersized fish, someone who picks and disposes of a protected flower,
or a camper who covers embers from a fire where it was not allowed, the Court appeared
reluctant to interpret the statute in a manner that would allow its application to such a wide
variety of trivial cases. In the words of Chief Justice Roberts, the statute’s 20‑year maximum
sentence would provide prosecutors “extraordinary leverage,” encouraging offenders to take
plea deals that would still exceed what is fitting for their conduct. Of particular concern to the
Justices was a statement made by the DOJ attorney that it is agency policy to seek the most
severe punishment available when pursuing prosecution.

As pointed out by the dissent, Section 1519 is not an outlier, “but an emblem of a deeper
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As pointed out by the dissent, Section 1519 is not an outlier, “but an emblem of a deeper
pathology in the federal criminal code.” Overly broad statutes with high maximum
punishments and affording prosecutors and judges a great deal of discretion are not uncommon
in our system, and undoubtedly contribute to our country’s status as the world leader in
incarceration (http://www.sentencingproject.org/template/page.cfm?id=107). Although the
decision in Yates at times seems as though the Court was reaching to achieve the desired
outcome, this case sends an important message that similar broadly worded statutes will be
closely scrutinized, including not only their legislative history, but also the context, title,
placement in the code, and the potential far reaching consequences.
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